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I. INTRODUCTION
Rotating custody, also known as joint, alternating, divided, split,
and shared1 custody, is defined as shared physical custody of a minor
child and shared parental responsibility.2 In rotating custody arrangements, the child lives with each parent for a substantial
amount of time, or at least thirty percent of the time.3 Some authorities define rotating custody more strictly, limiting the definition to an
arrangement where each parent has custody of the child fifty percent
of the time.4 Because, however, Florida courts and other authorities
consider custody arrangements providing that the child lives with
each parent for a substantial period of time to be rotating, this Comment follows the more flexible definitions of the term.5
* J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., summa
cum laude, College of Charleston, 2000.
1. Nelson v. Osgood, 689 So. 2d 1286, 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMM. ON THE FAMILY, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND THE
FAMILY 930 (1980) [hereinafter GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY].
2. See Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
3. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL REP. 102, THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY 16 (1985)
[hereinafter CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL]; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
supra note 1, at 930.
4. Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Cynthia A.
McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family
Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 951 (1998).
5. Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 747, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (affirming the
trial court’s final judgment of dissolution providing that the father have custody of the
child for eleven consecutive days each month); Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (Fla.
3d DCA 1996) (affirming the trial court’s order that the father have custody of the child
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Rotating custody means more than just alternating the physical
custody of the child. It also means that the parents have equal childrearing rights and responsibilities.6 Rotating custody arrangements
allow the parents to continue to share authority over the child, just
as they did in the marriage.7 Therefore, “neither parent is in a position to unilaterally impose his or her will on the other parent.”8 Furthermore, because each parent retains the authority to make decisions for the child, the parents must be able to cooperate for a rotating custody arrangement to benefit the family.9
Courts have consistently been reluctant to order rotating custody
or to enforce agreements between the parents providing for rotating
custody. For example, both the Roman law and the English common
law preferred giving the father sole custody when the marriage terminated.10 This presumption was so obstinately adhered to that the
“law would not give effect to . . . the paternal right . . . being bargained away.”11 In other words, upon dissolution of the marriage, the
parents were not allowed to agree that the mother would have custody of the children. Instead, because the father was entitled to his
child’s earnings and services and because the law obligated the father to maintain and support his child, custody of the child was always awarded to the father.12
In the early 1800s, some English courts began to abandon the idea
of absolute paternal rights to custody and started enforcing rotating
custody agreements to accomplish the goals of giving “both parents a
fair intercourse with [the children]” and of encouraging an “affectionate regard for the character and person of both [parents].”13 Although rotating custody was sanctioned as early as 1848 in England,14 the courts subsequently adopted a preference for awarding
sole custody of children under fourteen to the mother.15 Finally, in

during the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth grades and that the mother have custody of the
child during the ninth and tenth grades); CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL, supra note 3, at
15-17; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 1, at 930; MEL
MORGENBESSER & NADINE NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR DIVORCING
FAMILIES 30-31 (1981).
6. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 30.
7. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 16.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 17.
10. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 6; LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO
DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 174 (1990).
11. STONE, supra note 10, at 174.
12. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 6.
13. STONE, supra note 10, at 177 (quoting an unidentified source).
14. See id.
15. Id. at 180.
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1925, England enacted a statute providing that custody was to be determined based on the welfare of the child.16
Similarly, a majority of the states adopted the common law rule of
absolute paternal control, but abandoned the notion for the first time
in 1839.17 As in England, most American courts then began endorsing
rotating custody arrangements, but this preference was short-lived.18
Courts subsequently began to regularly award custody to the
mother,19 but in 1889 the Kansas Supreme Court first held that custody arrangements should be decided based on the child’s welfare
and best interest.20
Florida jurisprudence has followed a similar historical pattern. In
Randolph v. Randolph,21 the Florida Supreme Court explicitly abrogated the common law presumption that the father had a superior
right to the custody of his children. Even prior to Randolph’s overt
abolition of the preference for awarding custody to the father, the
Florida courts had deviated from the common law rule several
times.22 However, contrary to the pattern established in England and
in other states after the abolition of the paternal control presumption, the Florida courts were not partial to rotating custody arrangements, even for a short period of time.23 Instead, the Florida Supreme
Court was so opposed to the idea of rotating custody that it articulated a presumption against rotating custody arrangements in 1943

16. Id.
17. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 6.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
21. 1 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1941).
22. See Fields v. Fields, 197 So. 530, 531 (Fla. 1940) (awarding the mother sole custody of the three-year-old, and custody of the five and seven-year-olds for nine months out
of the year); Green v. Green, 188 So. 355, 356 (Fla. 1939) (affirming an award of custody of
a three-year-old girl to the mother); Putnam v. Putnam, 186 So. 517, 518 (Fla. 1939)
(affirming the modified decree of divorce which awarded custody to the mother for ten
months out of the year); Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464, 467-68 (Fla. 1933) (remanding
with instructions to award custody to the father for not less than three months in each
year); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 134 So. 201, 204 (Fla. 1931) (affirming award of custody to the
mother for eight months each year); Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Sauls, 123 So. 780, 780-81
(Fla. 1929); Trigo v. Trigo, 105 So. 123, 123 (Fla. 1925); Harris v. Harris, 61 So. 122, 122
(Fla. 1913).
23. From 1943 to 1985 only three rotating custody agreements were ordered. Watson
v. Watson, 15 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1943); Alexander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA
1985); Oldaker v. Oldaker, 263 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). Since the Alexander decision, Florida appellate courts have affirmed rotating custody arrangements only eight
times. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Voorhies v. Voorhies, 705
So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1998); O’Brien v. Crumley, 695 So. 2d 881, 882-83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Harpman v.
Harpman, 694 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 619
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Parker
v. Parker, 553 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
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in Phillips v. Phillips.24 From 1943 until 1997, the Florida courts
abided by the presumption that rotating custody is not in the best interests of a minor child, and only affirmed rotating custody arrangements a handful of times.25
In 1997 the Florida Legislature enacted section 61.121 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that “[t]he court may order rotating custody if the court finds that rotating custody will be in the best interest of the child.”26 Between May 23, 1997, and September 22, 1999,
four awards of rotating custody were affirmed.27 In other words, after
the courts were ostensibly granted permission to order rotating custody, they affirmed four orders in twenty-eight short months.28 However, prior to the enactment of section 61.121, the courts had affirmed only a few orders in fifty-four years.29
Curiously, though, the Second District Court of Appeal, in 1999,
reined in the Florida courts’ apparent freedom to grant rotating custody.30 In Mandell v. Mandell, the court, in dicta, stated that
“[n]othing in the plain language of [section 61.121] suggests that the
legislature intended to abolish the presumption” against rotating
custody.31 The court reasoned that because the legislative history of
House Bill 1421, which enacted section 61.121, explicitly set aside
another presumption found in section 61.13, “the legislature understood how to set aside a previously established presumption.”32
Therefore, because House Bill 1421 did not also include language
that unambiguously set aside the common law presumption against
rotating custody, the court concluded that the presumption was not
abolished by the legislation.33 Since the Mandell decision, Florida
courts have only ordered one rotating custody arrangement.34
Part II of this Comment examines the origin and evolution of Florida’s presumption against rotating custody arrangements. The advantages and disadvantages of such arrangements are also evaluated
in Part II, including the psychological effects of rotating custody on
minor children. Finally, Part III proffers a framework to guide the
judicial system’s implementation of rotating custody orders.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

13 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1943).
See supra note 23.
FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (2002).
See supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
Mandell v. Mandell, 741 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
Id. at 618.
Id.
Id.
Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
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II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF FLORIDA’S PRESUMPTION
AGAINST ROTATING CUSTODY
Florida courts have never been inclined to order rotating custody
arrangements, and, instead, have usually awarded custody to one
parent and granted visitation rights to the other parent.35 The presumption against rotating custody originated in 1943 in Phillips v.
Phillips.36 The Florida courts embraced the Phillips court’s absolute
presumption against rotating custody, but gradually began to consider various factors when determining whether to order rotating
custody instead of unquestionably applying the presumption.
A. The Origin
Phillips was the first decision to demonstrate Florida’s opposition
to dividing the minor child’s physical custody between the parents.
Upon granting Beatrice M. Phillips’s request for divorce, the judge
awarded custody of the seventeen-month-old boy to the father.37 Mrs.
Phillips appealed, arguing that the custody order should be modified.38 The appellate court agreed with Mrs. Phillips and awarded
custody of the boy to the father for the first week of every month and
to Mrs. Phillips for the remainder of the time.39 The Florida Supreme
Court, however, sided with Mr. Phillips on appeal and reversed the
appellate court’s modification of the original custody decree.40
The Court refused to uphold the modification order because the
condition precedent to the modification of a final decree of custody,
that the arrangement be “for the welfare of the child,” was not satisfied.41 The court reasoned that dividing custody of the child between
the parents would be detrimental to the child’s welfare because “no
man can serve two masters and it is certainly true that no child can
pursue a normal life when subject to the the [sic] precepts, example
and control of first one person and then another, regardless of how
well intentioned those persons may be.”42 The court extrapolated the
idea that dividing custody confused the child from its “experience”
and from its “common knowledge of man and affairs.”43 No other
source of authority supported the court’s conclusion.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See supra note 23.
13 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1943).
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id. at 923.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Early Evolution: 1943-1975
Although the presumption against rotating custody originated as
a product of judicial policymaking and was not based on precedent,
the concept quickly had a strong influence on the Florida courts. After 1943, the majority of judges unquestionably applied the presumption against rotating custody, deriving it either from Phillips and
other Florida decisions,44 from their experience and common knowledge,45 or from other states’ judicial decisions.46 Between 1943 and
1975, most courts employed similar language and, so long as both
parents were equally fit, failed to articulate any rationale for the
presumption.47 Even as late as 1975, most courts were still blindly
applying the rule that “unquestionably split custody decrees . . . are
not encouraged.”48 During this time period, only a few decisions deviated from the rule against rotating custody.49
Five months after the Florida Supreme Court first announced its
hostility toward divided custody in Phillips, the court affirmed a rotating custody arrangement in Watson v. Watson.50 Watson involved
the mother’s appeal of the final decree of divorce that awarded custody of the two girls to the father for six months and to the mother
for six months.51 The court rejected the mother’s request for full custody and affirmed the rotating custody arrangement because both
parents could provide the girls with equal opportunities.52 Furthermore, because both the mother and the father were employed outside
the home, the court’s usual preference for awarding custody to the
mother was not applicable.53
The court in Oldaker v. Oldaker54 also declined to exercise the
presumption against rotating custody. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the court ordered the parents to share custody of their three44. Stewart v. Stewart, 24 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 1946); Jones v. Jones, 23 So. 2d 623,
625 (Fla. 1945); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Unger v.
Unger, 306 So. 2d 540, 541-42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Julian v. Julian, 188 So. 2d 896, 897,
902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). But
cf. Ritsi v. Ritsi, 160 So. 2d 159, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (overturning a reversal of a shared
custody agreement and reinstating the original decree of shared custody).
45. Hurst v. Hurst, 27 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1946).
46. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d at 399.
47. See supra note 44; see also Phillips, 13 So. 2d at 922.
48. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d at 499.
49. Watson v. Watson, 15 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1943); Oldaker v. Oldaker, 263 So. 2d
250, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Lindgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 440, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA
1969).
50. 15 So. 2d at 447.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (“If she goes and returns as a wage earner like the father, she has no more
part in this responsibility than he and it necessarily follows that all things else being
equal, she has no better claim when the matter of custody is at issue.”).
54. 263 So. 2d at 250.
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year-old, rotating physical custody of the child every three months.55
Both parents appealed the rotating custody arrangement, but the
court affirmed the custody order saying “[i]n view of the child’s tender age of three, we do not feel that such an arrangement is against
the child’s best interest or welfare. . . . Perhaps a different arrangement will be necessitated when the child reaches school age.”56
Lindgren v. Lindgren57 is another decision that disregarded the
presumption against rotating custody. The mother appealed an order
awarding custody to the father for four days one week and three days
the next week.58 The court agreed that the general rule was not to affirm rotating custody orders, but recognized an exception to the general rule because the mother had an extramarital relationship.59 In
other words, because the father was more fit than the mother, the
preference of awarding custody to the mother did not apply and rotating custody was acceptable.60 Lindgren was the first case to recognize the presumption against rotating custody and then limit its application based on the circumstances of the case.61
C. Modern Evolution: 1975-1997
Between 1975 and July 1, 1997, the courts further developed the
Lindgren principle that “the prohibition against alternating custody
is not absolute.”62 Because the presumption was no longer “a rule of
law,” and instead became “an exercise of discretion by the trial
court,” the appellate courts were faced with the task of determining
“whether reasonable men could differ as to whether or not rotating
custody, under the circumstances of [the] case, is in the best interest
of the children.”63 Some courts applied various factor tests when deciding whether the circumstances of the case overcame the presumption against rotating custody.64 Others determined whether to order

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 220 So. 2d 440, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 440-41.
61. Id.; see also Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
(“Split custody can be condoned if there are special circumstances or legally unequal facts
present to support such an arrangement.”).
62. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
63. Id.
64. E.g., MacConnell v. Cascante, 668 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Garvie v.
Garvie, 659 So. 2d 394, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Langford v. Ortiz, 654 So. 2d 1237, 1238
(Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Caraballo v. Hernandez, 623 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993);
Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Parker v. Parker, 553 So. 2d
309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d at 1151; Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380
So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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rotating custody based on the facts of the case, but did not apply a
specific factor test when making that evaluation.65
Bienvenu v. Bienvenu66 was the first decision to delineate factors
justifying a rotating custody order:
Such factors might include, for example, older and more mature
children, parents who live near each other or are willing to cooperate in lessening the impact of the changes in custody, and a division of periods of custody which is related to actual events in the
children’s lives, such as between school and holiday periods.67

Although the court recognized that the presumption against rotating custody was not absolute, it reversed the order of rotating custody because two of the three factors justifying rotating custody were
not satisfied; the children were two and four-years-old and the parents were very antagonistic toward each other.68
Gerscovich v. Gerscovich69 clarified and added new considerations
to the Bienvenu factors.70 In addition to a division of periods of custody that relate to actual events in the child’s life, another factor that
courts take into account when deciding whether to allow rotating
custody is the reasonableness of the “length of each period of custody.”71 Furthermore, the child’s preference, considered in light of the
child’s maturity level, should also be weighed.72 Gerscovich also
broadened the Bienvenu factor of the proximity of the parents’ homes
to include any “disruptive influence[] created by differing surroundings in alternate custody periods.”73 Finally, Gerscovich clarified the
Bienvenu consideration of the parents’ willingness to cooperate, by
65. E.g., Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla.
1st DCA 1991); Chiafair v. Chiafair, 552 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); ex rel.
S.M.H., 531 So. 2d 228, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Gerner v. Gerner, 529 So. 2d 1226, 1226
(Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Alexander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Elebash v. Elebash, 450 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Tallent v. Tallent, 440 So. 2d
623, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Frey v. Wagner, 433 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Scott
v. Scott, 401 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173
(Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
66. 380 So. 2d at 1165.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1164-66.
69. 406 So. 2d 1151.
70. Id. at 1151, 1153.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1152. Contra Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
(“Although the preference of a child is one factor to be considered, it cannot control the disposition of custody.”).
73. 406 So. 2d at 1151; see also Harpman v. Harpman, 694 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997) (“[A] [f]actor[] that influenced the parties to agree to, and the court to approve,
rotating custody [was] . . . the fact that the children would attend the same school regardless of which household they were residing in.”); Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“Rotating custody between two distant cities should not be imposed
when the child is of school age.”).
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stating that this factor also includes how the children will perceive
the parents’ attitudes toward each other.74
Several other factors that overcome the presumption against rotating custody were also set forth during this time period. First,
courts more frequently order rotating custody when the child is not
yet old enough to go to school.75 Second, psychological or Guardian Ad
Litem reports recommending rotating custody militate in favor of rotating custody.76 The idea that animosity between the parents also
overcomes the presumption against rotating custody was first introduced in 1992 in Sullivan v. Sullivan.77 The court reasoned that the
mother’s hostile attitude supported rotating custody in order to prevent the mother from turning the child against the father.78 This factor, however, does not usually support rotating custody and, conversely, is a circumstance that weighs in favor of the application of
the presumption against rotating custody.79
Despite establishing that the presumption against rotating custody is not absolute, courts during this era continued to sparingly order rotating custody. During these twenty-two years, courts ordered
rotating custody less than ten times.80 Two of the orders were to terminate upon the child reaching school age.81 Three were ordered, in
part, because the children were sufficiently mature to state their
preferences.82 One order of rotating custody was ordered because of

74. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d at 1151.
75. See, e.g., Mooney v. Mooney, 729 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Bracken
v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Langford v. Ortiz, 654 So. 2d 1237,
1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Parker v. Parker, 553 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Alexander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). But see Hurst v. Hurst, 27 So.
2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1946) (“[W]e have grave doubt that an infant three years old can develop
normally and thrive if at the end of every six months he is removed from surroundings familiar to him and forced to become accustomed to new ones.”).
76. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Crumley, 695 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). But cf.
Garvie v. Garvie, 659 So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). See also Quinn v. Settel, 682 So.
2d 617, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Contra Garvey, 383 So. 2d at 1173 (“[A] trial court does
not surrender its discretion to psychologists or other experts testifying concerning the welfare of children where best interests are to be protected by the court.”).
77. 604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
78. Id.
79. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Lamelas v. Granados,
730 So. 2d 387, 388-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Bracken, 704 So. 2d at 748; Garvie, 659 So. 2d
at 396; Caraballo v. Hernandez, 623 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
80. Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1153
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Parker v. Parker, 553 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Alexander
v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
81. Parker, 553 So. 2d at 311; Alexander, 473 So. 2d at 237.
82. The children in the cases were all in their pre-teen or teenage years. Harpman v.
Harpman, 694 So. 2d 101, 102-03 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Quinn, 682 So. 2d at 618-19; Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d at 1153.
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the mother’s animosity toward the father,83 and one was ordered
simply because special circumstances justified the arrangement.84
D. Section 61.121, Florida Statutes, is Enacted
On July 1, 1997, section 61.121, Florida Statutes, became effective.85 The section provides that “[t]he court may order rotating custody if the court finds that rotating custody will be in the best interest of the child.”86 Between July 1, 1997, and September 22, 1999,
Florida appellate courts affirmed rotating custody orders three
times.87 Following the examples from Lindgren,88 Bienvenu,89 and
Gerscovich,90 the courts during this period also considered the special
circumstances of each case.91 In both Mooney v. Mooney,92 and
Bracken v. Bracken,93 the courts’ decisions to uphold the rotating custody orders were influenced by the fact that the rotating arrangement would terminate when the children reached school age.94 The
third affirmation of rotating custody occurred because there were no
substantial changes in circumstance requiring modification of the
original rotating custody order.95
1. The Florida Courts’ Reaction to Section 61.121
On September 22, 1999, the Second District Court of Appeal, in
Mandell v. Mandell,96 interpreted section 61.121 for the first time.
The court affirmed the trial court’s rotating custody order because
the husband rebutted “any presumption against rotating custody.”97
However, the decision’s dicta, and not the holding, most greatly impacted Florida’s rotating custody jurisprudence. In dicta, the court
went on to answer the parties’ question of “whether section 61.121,
Florida Statutes (1997), effectively sets aside the long held presumption that rotating custody is not in the best interest of a minor

83. Sullivan, 604 So. 2d at 879.
84. O’Brien v. Crumley, 695 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
85. FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (2002).
86. Id.
87. Mooney v. Mooney, 729 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Voorhies v.
Voorhies, 705 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746,
748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
88. 220 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
89. 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
90. 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
91. E.g., Bracken, 704 So. 2d at 747.
92. 729 So. 2d at 1015.
93. 704 So. 2d at 746.
94. Mooney, 729 So. 2d at 1016; Bracken, 704 So. 2d at 748.
95. Voorhies v. Voorhies, 705 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
96. 741 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
97. Id.
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child.”98 The court concluded that the statute’s plain language did not
indicate that the legislature meant to abolish the presumption, or, alternatively, if it did intend to abolish the presumption it failed to appropriately do so.99 The court considered the fact that the bill enacting section 61.121 also enacted section 61.13, which provides that
“[n]o presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and
the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and
access with the secondary residential parent.”100 According to the
Second District Court of Appeal, this language demonstrated that the
legislature understood how to abolish a presumption, and “[t]he absence of such language in section 61.121 leads us to conclude that either the legislature did not intend to set aside the presumption, or, if
it did, it failed to appropriately implement its intent.”101
Since Mandell, the Florida appellate courts have affirmed rotating
custody orders only two more times.102 These courts affirmed the rotating custody decrees because “[t]he [trial] court found the agreement was in the child’s best interest”103 and because an expert witness recommended rotating custody.104 Although the Florida Supreme Court has not yet validated the dicta in Mandell, the case was
cited favorably by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Mancuso v.
Mancuso,105 and in Hosein v. Hosein.106
E. The Advantages of Rotating Custody
There are numerous advantages to rotating custody. First, rotating custody can benefit both the parents and the child by fulfilling
their desires to maintain a close relationship.107 The concept of rotating custody recognizes the equal authority of both parents by allowing each parent to actively participate in the child’s life.108 Because
neither parent is treated as the visiting parent, the parent-child relationship is less likely to change.109 In contrast, when one parent only
has infrequent visitation rights, the parent-child relationship can be
drastically altered.110 The child, for example, may feel like he or she
98. Id. at 617-18.
99. Id. at 618.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Goins v. Goins, 762 So.
2d 1049, 1051-52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
103. Goins, 762 So. 2d at 1051.
104. Boardman, 775 So. 2d at 334.
105. 789 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
106. 785 So. 2d 703, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
107. DEBORAH ANNA LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY 42 (1982).
108. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 62.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 61.
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has been abandoned by the nonresidential parent.111 One study of
four rotating custody families revealed that “[n]one of the children
seemed to experience the severe loss of one parent reported in traditional custodial arrangements.”112 Therefore, rotating custody arrangements help to minimize the child’s feeling of abandonment because “[b]oth parents remain active participants in their child’s upbringing through their input into decisions . . . and the child knows
that both parents are available to give advice and guidance.”113
Another way that rotating custody benefits the parent-child relationship is by eliminating the parents’ need to compete for custody of
the child, thereby removing the possibility that the child will be
forced to choose one parent as the residential parent.114 This compelled decision can be emotionally difficult for the child, especially
when the child has a positive relationship with both parents.115 Additionally, when parents agree to rotating custody arrangements the
child is not exposed to “the legal custody battles and adversarial climate that surround sole custody contests.”116 Rotating custody arrangements, therefore, allow the child to continue a relationship with
both parents and remove the dilemma of a loyalty conflict.117
Yet another benefit of rotating custody for children is the fact that
the parents are forced to cooperate.118 Although the negative effects
of divorce will always impact the child, the child’s attitude about the
experience may be more positive if the parents are amicable.119 Children subject to a rotating custody arrangement may, therefore, feel
more optimistic about their future male-female relationships than
will children subject to sole custody arrangements.120 Additionally,
children subject to rotating custody arrangements will be better prepared for future relationships because it is more likely that they will
see each parent assume the roles of both a housekeeper and a wage
earner.121 Because parents today are more apt to share these roles,
the sole custody arrangement, patterned after the “traditional family
111. MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT
CUSTODY 120 (1978).
112. Alice Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint
Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320, 322-23 (1979).
113. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 62.
114. Id. at 43, 64.
115. Id.
116. Robert D. Felner & Lisa Terre, Child Custody Dispositions and Children’s Adaptation Following Divorce, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS:
KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 127 (Lois A. Weithhorn ed., 1987).
117. Id.
118. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 65, 66.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. RICHARD A. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 152-53 (1986).
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roles of the mother as sole homemaker and the father as the only
breadwinner,” does not provide role models compatible with modern
family life.122
Parents also benefit from rotating custody arrangements. Most
importantly, neither parent experiences the sense of loss and uncertainty about his or her parental role that is present in sole custody
arrangements.123 In addition to the loss of the child, the nonresidential parent may also suffer from a loss of self-esteem.124 “If one parent
is awarded primary custody after litigation, the visiting parent cannot help feeling that he or she has been judged the worse, or at least
the less adequate, of the two parents.”125 Rotating custody arrangements can ameliorate the sense of loss, role ambiguity, and the loss
of self-confidence.126
Another advantage of rotating custody arrangements is that the
one parent no longer must shoulder the childrearing burden by himself or herself. Rotating custody involves a situation where each parent is equally responsible for the physical and emotional development of the child.127 Both parents have an equal voice in the major
decisions of the child’s life.128 Therefore, rotating custody “means being free and a parent at the same time” because each parent has “100
percent of the responsibility 50 percent of the time [rather] than 50
percent of the responsibility 100 percent of the time.”129
Rotating custody also may avoid some of the conflicts associated
with sole custody arrangements.130 For example, a custody battle is
not necessary and is instead replaced with an arrangement requiring
cooperation and compromise.131 Moreover, because both parents have
equal authority, neither parent will resent the other’s dominance, a
feeling experienced by many parents in sole custody arrangements.132
Besides benefiting both the children and the parents, rotating custody is also advantageous to the courts.133 So long as the parents request rotating custody and are both fit and competent, the judge is
not required to spend time evaluating the reasons why one parent is
more competent than the other.134 Therefore, judicial energy and time
122. Id.
123. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 153; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
supra note 1, at 930; Felner & Terre, supra note 116, at 127.
124. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 153.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 1, at 930.
128. Id.
129. LUEPNITZ, supra note 107, at 43.
130. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 152.
131. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 66.
132. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 152.
133. Felner & Terre, supra note 116, at 127.
134. Id.
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are conserved when parents are appropriate candidates for rotating
custody arrangements.
F. The Disadvantages of Rotating Custody
Opponents of rotating custody have cited various disadvantages of
such an arrangement. The primary criticism of the Florida courts is
that rotating custody is confusing to the child because each parent
has different rules and the child will not know which ones to obey.135
“[N]o child can pursue a normal life when subject to the the [sic] precepts, example and control of first one person and then another, regardless of how well intentioned those persons may be.”136 Other authorities also recognize the concern that having two homes creates an
unpredictable and interrupted life for a child.137 Critics argue that
such disruption will affect the child physically and emotionally.138
However, this argument has been rejected by studies of rotating custody families. For example, one study concluded that after an initial
adjustment period, the children were no longer confused about
changing domiciles.139 Another source stated that although frequent
change is disruptive, children generally adapt well to change and are
not harmed by shifting homes.140
Another common grievance about rotating custody is that children
may be used as ammunition in parental battles.141 For example, one
parent may prohibit visitation when a support payment is overdue.142
Additionally, either or both parents may bargain and beg for more
time with the child.143 Using a child this way can result in divided
loyalties and psychological damage.144 However, the same difficulties
may be even more pronounced in sole custody arrangements because
nonresidential parents do not have as much authority as residential
parents and therefore, are more likely to need to use the children inappropriately.145 Rotating custody arrangements, in contrast, involve
shared parental authority and decision-making, thereby minimizing
the need to use the children as pawns.146

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

E.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 13 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1943).
Id.
GARDNER, supra note 121, at 154; MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 69.
MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 69.
Judith Brown Grief, Fathers, Children, and Joint Custody, 49 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 311, 317 (1979).
140. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 154.
141. Id. at 153.
142. Grief, supra note 139, at 318.
143. Id.
144. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 71.
145. Grief, supra note 139, at 318.
146. Id.
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Critics of rotating custody also recognize the daily inconveniences
for children. For example, a child may not be able to fall asleep at
night because his or her favorite toy is at the other parent’s house.147
One family stated that although the rotating custody arrangement
works, it has disadvantages.148 “Carting possessions around is tough .
. . Suitcases, nighttime animals, half an outfit here, half there—no
steady routine.”149
Another daily difficulty of rotating custody is the child’s inability
to establish meaningful relationships with his or her friends, unless
the parents live near each other.150 Additionally, when rotating custody arrangements involve long periods of custody, such as an
arrangement where the child lives with one parent during the school
year and with the other parent during the summer, the child may
also have trouble maintaining relationships with friends.151 Even
more worrisome is the contention that the interruptions of rotating
custody may hinder the child’s ability to bond emotionally with either
parent.152
Rotating custody may also have negative effects on the parents.
One common complaint made by parents subject to rotating custody
arrangements is that they cannot truly separate from each other.153
However, many divorced couples with children could make this same
complaint, regardless of the custody arrangement, because “[s]o
many couples are legally divorced but emotionally still married; they
simply carry on their marriages internally or through their children.”154 Therefore, few divorced couples will ever fully terminate
their relationship, especially where children are involved.155
Another challenge for parents in rotating custody arrangements is
the resolution of decisions about the child’s life.156 Opponents of rotating custody argue that it is unrealistic to expect that divorced parents can separate their marital and parental lives, and therefore, cooperate when making decisions about the child.157 This argument,
however, assumes that the divorced parents harbor hostile feelings
toward each other, and that they do not mutually respect each
other’s opinions.158 At least with time, divorced parents are more
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Felner & Terre, supra note 116, at 128.
LUEPNITZ, supra note 107, at 44.
MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id.

518

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:503

likely to minimize the role of their marital lives, and instead place
more emphasis on their parental lives, thereby permitting them to
agree on decisions affecting their child.
Parents, like their children, may be inconvenienced by rotating
custody arrangements. For instance, the children’s movement from
home to home creates logistical problems for parents who have to
spend time and money transporting them.159 Additional expenditures
may be necessary to make the child feel comfortable in both
houses.160 Parents may have to buy duplicate toys, personal belongings, and extra clothes in order for the child’s surroundings to be familiar.161
III. JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER
TO ORDER ROTATING CUSTODY
Because Mandell rejected the contention that section 61.121 abolished the presumption against rotating custody, Florida courts continue to infrequently award rotating custody. Sometimes the application of the presumption is justified. However, regardless of the Mandell decision, rotating custody is preferable for some divorcing couples and their children.
A. Justified Application of the Presumption
In addition to the Bienvenu-Gerscovich factors and the position of
a majority of the districts that rotating custody should not be ordered
when the parents do not get along,162 the Florida courts have recognized other situations where rotating custody should not be ordered.163 Although judges and practitioners may not be presented
with similar situations, assuming that they are, these cases may be
useful in guiding their decisions or predictions.
For example, in Jones v. Jones,164 a modification order granting
rotating custody was reversed; the fact that the wife sent the children to boarding school and, in the husband’s opinion, practically
abandoned the children, did not justify the rotating custody order.
Similarly, a court is unlikely to order rotating custody simply because one parent is a teacher and the other is not.165 Also, “[r]otating
159. LUEPNITZ, supra note 107, at 44.
160. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 78.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 79.
163. See Jones v. Jones, 23 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1945); Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991); ex rel. S.M.H., 531 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Garvey v. Garvey,
383 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA
1975); Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).
164. 23 So. 2d at 626.
165. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d at 499.
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custody between two distant cities should not be imposed when the
child is of school age.”166
Although psychologists’ and Guardian Ad Litem reports militate
in favor of rotating custody,167 where the only other circumstance
justifying rotating custody is the child’s stated preference, a court
may not “surrender its discretion to psychologists or other experts
testifying concerning the welfare of children where best interests are
to be protected by the court.”168 Likewise, the fact that the parents
are ages fifteen and sixteen does not justify an order of rotating
custody.169 Finally, rotating custody is not warranted even when both
parents and their families are competent and willing to provide an
excellent environment for the child.170
Other sources can provide judges and attorneys with more general, and therefore more practical, guidance. For instance, one authority suggests that rotating custody may not be successful if the
reason the parent seeks rotating custody is because the parent
wants, but is afraid he or she will not get, sole custody, and is willing
to settle for rotating custody.171 If rotating custody is awarded, problems may arise if one of the parents cannot accept the arrangement
and cooperate with the other parent.172 In other words, if the parent’s
desire to have sole custody outweighs his or her respect for the other
parent’s decisions and opinions about the child, then the rotating
custody arrangement will fail.173
When guilt compels a parent to seek rotating custody, a court
should not order rotating custody. Some parents think that they
should request rotating custody because, if they do not want custody
of the child, it must mean that they do not love the child.174 As rotating custody becomes a more common scenario, the parents may feel
more pressure to seek rotating custody.175 However, a rotating custody arrangement that is entered into because of societal and familial
influences is not likely to be very successful.176
Besides guilt, other motivations inducing parents to seek rotating
custody are vengeance and freedom.177 For example, seeking rotating
custody is an effective way to retaliate against a parent who desires
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Wilking, 582 So. 2d at 719.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
Garvey, 383 So. 2d at 1173.
See ex rel. S.M.H., 531 So. 2d 228, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Id.
MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 144-46.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
GARDNER, supra note 121, at 156-57.
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sole custody of the child.178 Although this motive may be a good battle
strategy, courts and attorneys should not order rotating custody
when vengeance is the incentive for the request, as this is an indicator that the parents do not get along.
The desire for more personal freedom influences some requests for
rotating custody.179 While rotating custody arrangements do provide
more freedom to the parents,180 that liberty should not be the primary reason for seeking rotating custody. In other words, parents
should not use this option as a means to assume less responsibility
for raising the children,181 because in rotating custody arrangements,
both parents “have 100 percent of the responsibility 50 percent of the
time.”182
Rotating custody also may not be successful when divorcing parents answer any of the following questions negatively:
Do I think that my former spouse is a good parent?
Do I believe that the type of joint custody arrangement I want
allows for the stability and consistency necessary for our child?
Am I willing to discuss matters related to our child with my former spouse?
Do my former spouse and I have compatible beliefs about raising
children?
Am I willing to ask for help in settling major differences that
might arise between my former spouse and I concerning our child?
As circumstances change, am I willing to make adjustments in
our joint custody arrangement to maximize the potential for its
success?183

Although a negative answer to all or any of the questions may not
signify that rotating custody will fail, parents who answer “no” to any
of the questions should think carefully about entering into a rotating
custody arrangement.184
A 1997 study concluded that psychologists are less likely to recommend rotating custody if all or some of the following five factors
are present: (1) “Parents do not cooperate or communicate”; (2) “Conflict or hostility between parents”; (3) “Geographical distance between parents”; (4) “Family or domestic violence history”; (5) “Children cannot adjust to transitions or are too young.”185 The majority of
178. Id. at 157.
179. Id. at 156.
180. See supra note 73.
181. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 156.
182. LUEPNITZ, supra note 107, at 43.
183. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 147-48.
184. Id. at 147.
185. Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Custody Evaluation Practices: A Survey of Experienced Professionals (Revisited), 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 137, 143
(1997).
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the psychologists interviewed agreed that the two most important
considerations when deciding whether to recommend rotating custody are the parents’ ability to cooperate and communicate, and the
amount of hostility between the parents.186 Additionally, forty-one
percent thought that the proximity of the parents’ homes was important, twenty-eight percent considered family or domestic violence as
significant, and twenty-two percent thought that the child’s ability to
adjust or the child’s age was important.187
1. When Rotating Custody Should be Ordered
The Second, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal agree that
rotating custody should only be ordered when the divorced parents
can communicate and cooperate.188 However, the Fourth and First
District Courts of Appeal cite parental hostility as a factor in favor of
ordering rotating custody.189 Psychologists agree with the former position that antagonism militates in favor of applying the presumption
against rotating custody.190
Bienvenu was the first case to indicate that parental hostility was
not a special circumstance justifying a rotating custody arrangement.191 The court reversed the trial judge’s order of rotating custody
to parents who were involved in a bitter custody battle.192 The court
reasoned that a presumption against rotating custody applies when
the “mother and father are . . . mutually antagonistic.”193
The Fifth District Court of Appeal first demonstrated its commitment to the idea that hostility militates in favor of applying the presumption against rotating custody in Garvie v. Garvie.194 The court
reversed a rotating custody order, in part, because the parents could
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334-35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Lamelas v.
Granados, 730 So. 2d 387, 388-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Laskey v. Peeler, 704 So. 2d 1066,
1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Garvie v. Garvie, 659 So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995);
Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So.
2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
189. See Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Caraballo v.
Hernandez, 623 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 604 So. 2d 878,
879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). But cf. Hosein v. Hosein, 785 So. 2d 703, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
190. See Christy M. Buchanan & Kelly L. Heiges, When Conflict Continues after the
Marriage Ends, in INTERPARENTAL CONFLICT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 337, 353 (John H.
Grych et al. eds., 2001); Felner & Terre, supra note 116, at 127-28; GARDNER, supra note
121, at 155; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 1, at 932;
Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 185, at 142-43; Susan Steinman, The Experience of
Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Report of a Study, 51 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 414 (1981).
191. 380 So. 2d at 1165.
192. Id. at 1164, 1166.
193. Id. at 1165.
194. 659 So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
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not get along.195 Applying the Bienvenu-Gerscovich factors, the court
concluded that:
[A]lthough the record does not establish that rotating custody
would have a disruptive effect on the child, it does establish that
the parties have a great deal of animosity toward each other and
have difficulty conferring on issues affecting the child. Thus, we
can reasonably foresee that this mutual antagonism, coupled with
this inability to communicate, would have a distressing effect on
the child in a rotating custody arrangement.196

Subsequently, other courts in the Fifth District followed Garvie, citing similar rationales for overturning rotating custody orders.197
The First and Fourth Districts disagree, and conversely argue,
that hostility between the parents is a special circumstance that
overrides the presumption against rotating custody.198 In Sullivan v.
Sullivan,199 for example, the court affirmed a rotating custody order
where the parents did not live far apart, where the length of each period of custody was reasonable, where the child was not yet of school
age, and where the mother’s attitude was antagonistic. Evidence of
the wife’s hostile attitude included her refusal to allow the father to
visit the child, her denial of his paternity, and her behavior during
the hearing.200 The trial court stated that “[t]he child is at a young
and impressionable age and given the hostility evident in the
mother’s attitude, demeanor and testimony, the court is concerned
whether or not she will imbue the child with her attitude against the
father.”201 Therefore, to preclude the possibility that the mother
would turn the child against the father, the trial court ordered rotating custody and the appellate court supported its decision.202
The Fourth District Court of Appeal follows an identical approach,
reversing rotating custody orders when “there is no evidence to indicate that the parties harbor negative attitudes or hostility toward
each other.”203 Rotating custody was also ordered by a trial court
when the parental sentiments were less than hostile. In Hosein v.
Hosein,204 the trial court had ordered rotating custody because the
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Lamelas v. Granados, 730 So. 2d 387, 388-89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Laskey v.
Peeler, 704 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
198. See Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Caraballo v.
Hernandez, 623 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 604 So. 2d 878,
879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). But cf. Hosein v. Hosein, 785 So. 2d 703, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
199. 604 So. 2d at 879.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Caraballo, 623 So. 2d at 565.
204. 785 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
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parties had a tendency to unilaterally make decisions about the
child. Rotating custody would prevent one parent from prohibiting
the other parent’s involvement in the child’s life.205 However, it is uncertain whether an appellate court would sanction this less-thanhostile standard because the rotating custody order was remanded so
the court could apply the Bienvenu-Gerscovich factors.206
The Second District Court of Appeal first recognized the conflict
between the district courts of appeal in Boardman v. Roy.207 The
Boardman court affirmed the trial court’s rotating custody order, but
disagreed with the trial court’s reliance on the parents’ hostility as a
factor overcoming the presumption against rotating custody.208 The
court opposed the First and Fourth Districts’ consideration of parental animosity as a factor militating in favor of rotating custody because that policy would encourage “untoward conduct with the hope
that it will result in rotating custody.”209 The court also reasoned that
the parents’ inability to get along would result in a failed rotating
custody agreement.210
For determinations of child custody in non-rotating arrangements,
the Florida Legislature suggests that one factor in favor of awarding
physical custody to a parent is the fact that the parent “is more likely
to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.”211 Furthermore, “[t]he willingness and ability of each
parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent” also militates in
favor of awarding a parent physical custody.212 Therefore, because
the legislature promotes friendly parenting in other child custody arrangements, it is likely that it would agree with the view of the Second, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal that parental hostility
does not militate in favor of rotating custody arrangements.
Psychologists agree with the Second, Third, and Fifth District
Courts of Appeal. One survey of 201 psychologists revealed that two
principle factors that psychologists consider when deciding whether
to recommend rotating custody are the “[a]bility of the parents to
separate their interpersonal difficulties from their parenting decisions” and “[t]he amount of anger and bitterness between the parents.”213 The survey concluded that rotating custody is preferred

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
See id.
775 So. 2d 334, 334-35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a) (2002).
Id. § 61.13(3)(j).
Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 185, at 142.
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when there is more communication and cooperation between the parents, or at least the absence of conflict.214
Other authorities have reached similar conclusions. An article
published in 1980 in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry suggested that rotating custody is most successful when the parents are
cooperative.215 The article determined that certain parental characteristics are congruent with orders of rotating custody and stated
that:
[T]he most crucial and beneficial components of joint custody for
the children lie in the attitudes, values, and behavior of their parents. The cooperative and respectful relationship between the parents for the purpose of child-rearing, and each parent’s support of
the child’s relationship with the other parent, seemed to be more
significant in helping the children adjust to the divorce than making sure that the time the children spent with each parent was
precisely equal.216

A child custody guidebook for parents and mental health professionals employs similar language, stating that rotating custody should
not be ordered unless the parents can cooperate, communicate, and
are willing to compromise.217 A final authority standing for the
proposition that a successful rotating custody arrangement requires
cooperative parents concludes that rotating custody “should not be
imposed on a fighting couple as a way of compromising or resolving
the dispute.”218 Instead, rotating custody “should be a goal, an end for
divorcing parents to work towards, assuming that both of them can
see its value.”219
The accuracy of the conclusion that parental animosity should not
weigh in favor of a rotating custody order is reflected by children’s
adjustment to rotating custody. Children generally adjust more easily when cooperative parents voluntarily choose rotating custody.220
When rotating custody is court-imposed on hostile parents, however,
children may have more difficulty adjusting to the new situation.221
Because children more readily adjust to rotating custody when the
parents get along, the presence of parental animosity requires the
application of the presumption against rotating custody. If the rule
were otherwise, courts would be sanctioning a custody arrangement
that children have difficulty adjusting to.
214.
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If, however, rotating custody is ordered in a situation where the
parents do not get along, the potential conflict and its impact on the
child can be minimized. One suggestion is to limit exchanges of the
child to public places, such as the child’s school, so that the parents
can avoid contact and controversy.222 Therefore, rotating custody arrangements may still be effective, even in the presence of hostile parents, so long as both parents care about the child.223
Another important consideration justifying rotating custody is the
child’s attachment to both parents, according to approximately 115
out of 201 psychologists.224 The same survey revealed that other factors influencing psychologists to recommend rotating custody included the parents’ emotional stability and desire to have a rotating
custody arrangement.225
Rotating custody is only a viable option when “[b]oth parents are
reasonably and equally capable of assuming the responsibilities of
child rearing.”226 Capability of the parents includes availability and
psychological stability.227 For example, if one parent cannot assume
the financial obligations inherent in raising children, then rotating
custody should not be ordered.228
Similarly, another authority attributes successful rotating custody
arrangements to four factors: (1) “commitment to the arrangement,”
(2) “the parents’ mutual support,” (3) “flexible sharing of responsibility,” and (4) “agreement on the implicit rules of the system.”229 Commitment to the arrangement means that both parents believe that
rotating custody is the best alternative.230 Mutual parental support
connotes the idea that each parent encourages and facilitates the
child’s relationship with the other parent.231 This relationship can be
achieved when the ex-spouses trust each other’s parenting ability
and promote the development of a relationship with the other parent.232 If parents have mutual respect and the child is free to explore
each relationship, the child will not suffer as greatly from the emotional trauma of divorce.233
In successful rotating custody arrangements, parents must also be
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able to flexibly share the responsibilities.234 Although parents do not
have to see each other often, they must be willing to schedule and allocate responsibility.235 Furthermore, an emergency plan needs to be
in place in case the parent is unable to perform his or her duty.236
Parents subject to a rotating custody arrangement must also
agree upon the implicit rules, meaning that parents must “[w]ork out
. . . how much contact to have, both as parents and as people; how
much to overlap the two households; what kind, how much, and how
to share information; whether and how to give the other parent critical or positive feedback about his or her parenting.”237 In other words,
parents must learn how to co-exist as parents and friends, instead of
spouses. If parents can make that transition, rotating custody arrangements are likely to be successful.
Some authorities suggest that the instability of rotating custody
arrangements is detrimental to younger children and, therefore, it
should not be ordered when the children are young.238 However, Florida courts do not consider a child’s young age to militate in favor of
applying the presumption against rotating custody.239 Likewise, Florida courts are not deterred from ordering rotating custody when the
child is older, if the presence of other factors indicates that rotating
custody would be in the child’s best interest.240 Therefore, although a
child’s young age should be considered, it should only secondarily influence the decision whether to order rotating custody. Hence, where
other factors demonstrate that rotating custody would be in the
child’s best interest, courts should not be precluded from ordering
such arrangements simply because the child is young.

234. Id.
235. Abarbanel, supra note 112, at 326.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 154 (“[Rotating custody’s] critics claim that having
two homes can give a child a sense of unpredictability and a lack of environmental continuity. Although this is detrimental for a child, it probably is not relevant to children older
than three or four.”).
239. Watson v. Watson, 15 So. 2d 446, 447-48 (Fla. 1943) (affirming rotating custody of
a five-year-old girl and a three-year-old girl); Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 747-48
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (affirming rotating custody of a pre-school child); Alexander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming rotating custody of a two-year-old
girl); Oldaker v. Oldaker, 263 So. 2d 250, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (affirming rotating custody of a three-year-old); Lindgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (affirming rotating custody of three-year-old twins).
240. See Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (affirming rotating
custody of a seventh grader); Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1152-53 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1981) (affirming rotating custody of an eleven-year-old and a fifteen-year-old).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Florida’s presumption against rotating custody should be abolished in favor of a system that permits judges to order and approve
rotating custody arrangements more frequently and more freely. Assuming that the divorced parents can cooperate, communicate, respect each other’s parental authority, and separate their past marital
roles from their parental roles, rotating custody is the most fulfilling
arrangement for both the parents and the child. Rotating custody
promotes continued contact with both parents, thereby ameliorating
the feeling of abandonment that many children in sole custody arrangements experience. The child does not have to endure the emotional trauma of choosing a residential parent and the parents are
not subjected to the taxing adversarial process. Florida’s presumption against rotating custody deprives parents and their children of
these, and other, benefits. Because the child’s and the parents’ best
interests are only harmed by this limitation, the Florida courts must
be permitted to equally consider rotating custody as an option for
families desiring and deserving its benefits.

